

REPORT 06

Legal-Analytical Report on the Consular-Legal Protection Obligations of the Embassy of the Republic of Azerbaijan in the Federal Republic of Germany in the Case of Ismail Rustam, the Embassy's Awareness, Its Assistance Measures, and the Insufficiency of That Assistance

Applicant / Claimant: Ismail Rustam / Rustem Ismail / Rustam Azeri

Principal country: Federal Republic of Germany

State from which protection is requested: Republic of Azerbaijan

Subject: Risk to the life, health, legal protection, preservation of evidence, and physical security of an Azerbaijani citizen abroad; consular-legal obligations of the Embassy; alleged long-term chain of state responsibility within Germany.

1. Purpose of the Report

This report aims to provide a legal-analytical assessment of what information the Embassy of the Republic of Azerbaijan in the Federal Republic of Germany possessed regarding the case of Azerbaijani citizen Ismail Rustam, at which stages it provided real assistance, and at which stages that assistance did not develop into continuous, systematic, and result-tracking consular protection.

This report is not presented as an accusation against the Azerbaijani state, but as a documentary-legal analysis prepared for the legal protection of an Azerbaijani citizen abroad.

The report does not deny that the Embassy took real steps at certain stages. On the contrary, those steps are noted separately. The legal issue is whether those steps were continued at a level corresponding to the seriousness of the case, the risk to life and health, the more than 7,000 pages of material, the need for international legal expertise, the alleged 2019 medical death-risk, the chain involving the theft or destruction of the iPhone 5 and iPhone 13 Pro evidence devices, the 2023-2024 physical attacks, the police/prosecutorial responses, and the current danger warning.

The purpose of this report is not merely to criticize the Embassy. The main purpose is to show that the chain presented by the applicant regarding life, health, evidence, and physical security inside Germany must no longer be treated as an ordinary citizen complaint, but as a matter requiring urgent consular protection of an Azerbaijani citizen abroad.

2. Precise Terminological Note

The expression used in this report - "the state did not protect me; I was forced to protect myself from the state" - must not be understood as directed against the Republic of Azerbaijan. It is the applicant's personal position regarding German state structures.

The precise formulation is:

"The German state did not protect me; I was forced to protect myself from the German state."

This expression reflects the applicant's position that, in relation to the German police, prosecutors, hospitals, courts, social authorities, health-insurance system, and other state mechanisms, he did not feel protected, but rather unprotected and endangered.

The applicant states that, in his situation, the state mechanisms that were supposed to protect him - the police, prosecutors, courts, social-protection authorities, hospitals, and health insurance - for years failed to protect his life, health, and evidence and, in his view, left him even more defenseless. Therefore, the central emphasis of this report is that the applicant seeks protection and consular patronage from the Embassy of Azerbaijan against German state mechanisms.

3. Method and Levels of Evidence

This report distinguishes three levels:

First - facts visible in documents: official letters, court documents, medical certificates, Embassy and Ombudsman/Ministry of Foreign Affairs documents, previous ChatGPT legal analysis reports, police/prosecutorial file numbers, and submissions to the Sozialgericht and Kammergericht.

Second - the applicant's witness account: events the applicant states that he personally experienced, including his explanations concerning hospitals, police, the Embassy, lawyers, O2, street attacks, phone thefts, and evidence devices.

Third - the political-diplomatic timing to be investigated: the question whether rhetoric of sanctions, Council of Europe/PACE pressure, and political pressure by Germany against Azerbaijan affected the Embassy's conduct in the applicant's case.

This report is not a court judgment. However, on the basis of the submitted documents and previous AI-assisted legal reports, it constitutes a legal map requiring serious consular, human-rights, and international investigation.

4. Legal Basis

According to the substance of Article 53 of the Constitution of the Republic of Azerbaijan, the Republic of Azerbaijan must provide legal protection and patronage to its citizens living abroad.

This obligation is not limited to passports, identity documents, or consular registration. If a citizen living abroad applies to the Embassy regarding serious illness, lack of police/prosecutorial protection, lack of judicial protection, physical attack, theft of evidence, violation of human dignity, and the need for international legal assistance, the matter must be assessed beyond the level of an ordinary consular service.

Article 5 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations includes among consular functions the protection in the receiving state of the interests of the sending state and of its nationals, assistance to nationals, and, where necessary, appropriate mechanisms of representation and assistance for the protection of their rights.

This does not mean that the Embassy may directly interfere in German courts. However, it may require the Embassy to take steps such as collecting documents, making official inquiries, providing legal orientation, searching for specialist lawyers, communicating in writing with hospitals/police/prosecutors, sending a detailed report to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and creating a continuous consular file.

In addition, the chain presented by the applicant may potentially engage the following rights and obligations under international law:

- ECHR Article 2 - right to life;
- ECHR Article 3 - prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment;
- ECHR Article 6 - right to a fair trial;
- ECHR Article 8 - protection of private life, physical and moral integrity, and family life;
- ECHR Article 13 - effective remedy;
- ECHR Article 14 - prohibition of discrimination;
- ICCPR Articles 6, 7, 9, 17, 26 and 2(3) - life, prohibition of inhuman treatment, security, privacy, equality, and effective remedy;
- CAT Articles 12, 13 and 16 - effective investigation of allegations of ill-treatment;
- CRPD Articles 5, 13, 15, 16, 17, 22 and 25 - equality of persons with disabilities, access to justice, protection from violence, physical and mental integrity, privacy, and the right to health;
- ICESCR Article 12 - access to the highest attainable standard of health;

- Under German law, Grundgesetz Article 1, Article 2(2), Article 3, Article 19(4), as well as obligations under social and criminal-procedural law concerning effective investigation, preservation of evidence, medical assistance, and urgent legal protection.

This legal framework is also significant for the Embassy. If a citizen abroad alleges such serious violations of rights, consular protection must not remain limited to "consult a lawyer" or "the police responded."

5. Important Note That the Embassy Was Not Completely Passive

The applicant specifically states that the Embassy of the Republic of Azerbaijan in Germany was not completely passive in his case.

According to the applicant's account, in 2008-2009 a lawyer named Thomas Ruhland was brought into his case through the Embassy or the diaspora channel. The applicant states that at that stage he did not personally pay the lawyer's fee. This should be investigated as a fact indicating the existence of a real assistance initiative by the Embassy or the Azerbaijani diaspora.

In 2013, during a reception by Ambassador Parviz Shahbazov, a meeting was organized at the Embassy building with Dr. Parviz Yazdani, and the applicant states that he personally handed over more than 7,000 pages of CDs/materials to Yazdani on the Ambassador's instruction. The letter of thanks dated 08.07.2013 should also be assessed as important material showing that, at that stage, the Embassy listened to the applicant and took a certain assistance step.

In 2024, the Embassy also did not remain completely passive. In the response letter of 26.11.2024, No. 004/MR/600-1224, from the Embassy/MIA representative, it is stated that the Berlin Police had been contacted, that information had been received regarding the events of 30.06.2023 and 13.11.2024, that the identity of the attacker in the 13.11.2024 Hermannplatz incident had been established, and that video footage had been obtained.

For this reason, Report 06 does not present the Embassy as an institution that "did nothing." The main legal problem lies elsewhere: the Embassy's initial and certain real assistance steps did not later develop into continuous, systematic, expert-based, and result-tracking consular protection.

6. The Parviz Yazdani Line and the More Than 7,000 Pages of Material

The available materials show that, in 2013, the Embassy was aware of the existence of more than 7,000 pages of court and legal material concerning Ismail Rustam. The Embassy stated that these materials had been given to Dr. Parviz Yazdani and that he had prepared a certain legal review.

The Yazdani line is important in two respects.

On the one hand, it shows that the Embassy took a certain real step. The Embassy did not completely ignore the applicant; it arranged for a legal professional to review the materials.

On the other hand, Yazdani's general summary showed how complex this case was. The fact that the materials exceeded 7,000 pages showed that the case was not an ordinary legal dispute, but a major human-rights and international-law case. If Yazdani indicated the need for a specialist lawyer in asylum law, international law, and the European Convention on Human Rights, the Embassy should have treated that summary not as a final conclusion, but as an initial warning document.

In that situation, the Embassy's duty did not end with saying "Yazdani reviewed it." The Embassy should have created a higher-level legal-defense mechanism, found a specialist lawyer in international law and ECHR procedure, assisted in the legal systematization of the submitted materials, and sent a detailed consular-legal report to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

In the applicant's view, Yazdani's summary was in fact not an "the case is closed" document for the Embassy, but a warning that "this case requires higher-level legal protection."

7. The Thomas Ruhland Issue and the Later 200 EUR Payment Line

The applicant states that Ruhland was initially brought into his defense through the Embassy or the diaspora channel. However, he does not present Ruhland's later conduct as a direct instruction from the Embassy.

In the applicant's view, Ruhland's conduct after the 2009 court process must be investigated separately. In particular, the payment of 200 EUR from the applicant's own living/material-support funds through the Betreuer is of separate legal significance.

The applicant believes that if Ruhland's later conduct had been supported by the earlier assisting side, his fee would have been paid from the same source as before. The later deduction of 200 EUR from the applicant's living funds indicates, in the applicant's view, that the defense chain had broken and that a separate legal violation may have occurred.

Questions to be investigated in this regard:

1. Who paid Ruhland's fee in 2008-2009?
 2. On what legal basis was the later 200 EUR deducted from the applicant's funds?
 3. In making this payment, did the Betreuer act consistently with the duty to protect the applicant's subsistence minimum and legal interests?
 4. Can this payment be assessed as indirect evidence that Ruhland's later conduct was not supported by the Embassy or by the earlier assisting party?
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8. The 2003 Heart Event Must Be Investigated Not as a Mere "Suspicion," but as a Serious Cardiac Intervention

In Report 008, the 2003 heart-crisis / cardiac-crisis / heart-attack-and-surgery line was left open and identified as a matter to be investigated through full hospital, court, and lawyer documents.

The applicant states that the 2003 document package he has now submitted strengthens this line further.

The applicant specifically emphasizes that this event must not be limited to soft expressions visible in the documents, such as "V.a. Myokarditis" or "suspected heart disease."

According to the applicant's witness account, he underwent a closed/invasive heart intervention in hospital at that time. According to his description, a thick medical instrument was inserted into an artery through the vascular area between his legs; through that instrument, a wire-like device was advanced toward the heart; the process was monitored on a screen and the doctors also looked at that image. The applicant states that he was not under general anesthesia. According to his account, the main pain occurred when the thick instrument was inserted into the vascular area, while he did not experience the remaining stage as painful in the manner of an open surgery. At the end of the procedure, he was told that a substance would be injected that would create the sensation of a boiling liquid in his body, and he states that he actually experienced that sensation.

From a medical perspective, this account must be investigated not as an ordinary examination, but as the possibility of cardiac catheterization or a similar invasive cardiac procedure. The applicant does not claim to make the final medical diagnosis himself, but states that he in fact underwent a serious intervention involving the heart.

The 2003 document package also gives particular importance to the application of Bümlein Rechtsanwaltskanzlei / Muharrem Aras dated 23.10.2003. That document shows that interim legal protection under Section 123 VwGO was requested before the Verwaltungsgericht Berlin, 32nd Chamber. In the family/complaint document, the court file number for this line is stated as VG 32 A 599/03. This file number must be officially verified from the complete court file.

If the VG 32 A 599/03 file and the hospital archives confirm that, in 2003, there was a heart crisis / serious cardiac intervention / hospital treatment followed by an urgent legal-protection application, this strengthens an important question left open in Report 008.

In that case, the German authorities were no longer deciding an abstract social-assistance or administrative matter, but were dealing with a person who had suffered a serious heart event, needed medical and social protection, and whose life and health were at real risk.

9. The Importance of Report 005 and Report 008 for Report 06

Report 005 shows that, before the German Bundestag Petitions Committee, the applicant raised claims concerning serious illness, denial of treatment, social defenselessness, lack of legal protection, and risk to life. According to the legal conclusion of that report, although the Bundestag petitions were formally received and closed, the visible documents do not show that the serious medical and human-rights allegations were examined in a sufficiently individualized and in-depth manner.

Report 008 analyzes the 1998-2009 chain under the claim characterized as "living death" - that is, the destruction of life while still alive. This report identifies the 1999 Köpenick prison incident, denial of medical assistance, obstacles to social assistance and Krankenschein, the 2003 heart event, the 2004 Reichstag life-and-death protest, the delayed 2005 court correction, and the 2009 Betreuung/guardian chain as events that must be investigated together.

In the applicant's view, the presentation of the 2003 document package strengthens an important line left open in Report 008. If those documents, the VG 32 A 599/03 file, and the hospital archives together confirm a serious cardiac event in 2003 and a subsequent legal-protection application, this may constitute an important evidentiary line showing that the state authorities were already aware at that time of a serious risk to life and health.

For this reason, the Embassy of Azerbaijan should assess Report 005, Report 008, and the 2003 document package not as separate documents, but as parts of the same long-term chain involving life, health, legal protection, and state responsibility.

10. Methodological Note: The Periods Must Not Be Confused

In Report 06, the periods must not be confused.

The 2008-2013 period concerns the Embassy, Ruhland, Yazdani, the more than 7,000 pages of material, the ECtHR, the political-diplomatic pressure context surrounding Azerbaijan, and Azerbaijan's occupied territories, refugees, frontline tension, and war risk at that time.

The 2019 period is not a war-context issue, but a medical-death-risk issue. The core matters here are suspected Kaposi sarcoma/cancer, hospitals, biopsy, diagnostics, treatment, evidence allegedly stored on the iPhone 5, and the request for help from the Embassy.

The 2023-2024 period concerns the theft of evidence-bearing phones, street attacks, police/prosecutorial responses, and the 24.01.2024 PACE decision as an issue to be investigated from the standpoint of timing.

The 2025-2026 period, in the applicant's view, concerns the renewed ineffectiveness of protection mechanisms in the medical, dental, social, prosecutorial, court, OLG/Kammergericht, Sozialgericht, enforcement, and GdB 100 rights fields - in other words, the effective non-functioning of all state mechanisms.

This methodological separation is important in order to preserve the legal seriousness of the report.

11. Azerbaijan's Political-Diplomatic and Security Context in 2008-2013

The applicant specifically emphasizes that the situation of the Republic of Azerbaijan in the 2008-2013 period must not be described merely as "political weakness" or "diplomatic difficulty."

At that time, Azerbaijan was facing occupied territories, refugees and internally displaced persons, frontline tension, military risk, and political-diplomatic sensitivity in relation to major states. This context does not fully exonerate the Embassy's conduct, but it must be taken into account when assessing the difficult and cautious conditions in which the Embassy may have been acting.

This context applies only to the 2008-2013 period. It is not automatically applicable to the 2019 medical events.

12. The Applicant's Condition of Assessment - The Analogy of Ten Children in the Forest

The applicant explains his position through a simple but grave analogy:

A parent is walking through a forest with ten children in a dangerous and life-threatening situation. As a result of a natural disaster and an attack by hundreds of predators, one of the children begins to be torn apart. If the parent tries to save that one child, the other nine children, left defenseless, will inevitably be torn apart by the same predators. The parent has no weapon, no means of defense, no real possibility of rescue, and no power to call for help. If the parent tries to save one child, the parent faces the destruction of the entire family.

The applicant compares this analogy to the situation of the Azerbaijani state in the 2008-2013 period. In his personal assessment, Azerbaijan at that time faced occupation, refugees, the Karabakh problem, continuing military danger, international pressure, and diplomatic weakness before major states. In such circumstances, openly confronting a powerful state such as Germany could have posed a major political and security risk for Azerbaijan.

Under this analogy, the applicant poses a direct question to every reader of the report:

What would you do if you were in that parent's place?

Would you take an action that might save one child but cause the other nine children to be torn apart?

Or would you carry the tragedy of one child in your heart while trying to save the remaining nine children?

In the applicant's view, no person who does not answer this question in his or her own conscience can fairly assess the Embassy's conduct in the 2008-2013 period, Azerbaijan's diplomatic and security situation at that time, or the political-legal context of this report.

This question is not posed to fully acquit the Embassy. It is posed to understand the deadlock of that period, the difficult choices a weak state may face before a great power, and the tragic contradiction that can arise between the protection of one citizen and the interests of an entire state.

13. Joint Investigation of the 2009, 2013, and 2024 Political-Diplomatic Pressure Lines

In Report 06, the 24.01.2024 PACE event must not be presented alone and in isolation. In the applicant's view, the political-diplomatic meaning of the 2024 event can be understood more correctly only if examined together with the 2009 and 2013 contexts.

The first line to be investigated is the 2009 context. The applicant states that in November-December 2009, during the period of Thomas Rühland's involvement, the court proceedings, and the expert-opinion issue, German leadership or German media used rhetoric against Azerbaijan concerning the Council of Europe, sanctions, exclusion, or political pressure. The applicant specifically requests that the alleged speech/ultimatum line connected to Angela Merkel be investigated. In the present report, this matter must be noted not as a definitively confirmed fact, but as a claim to be verified separately through media, television, and diplomatic archives.

The second line to be investigated is the 2013 context. During that period, the Embassy of Azerbaijan took a certain assistance step through Dr. Parviz Yazdani regarding the applicant's more than 7,000 pages of material and ECtHR problem. In the same general period, within the Council of Europe/PACE framework, there existed the political-prisoners issue concerning Azerbaijan, Christoph Strasser's draft resolution, and the political-diplomatic controversy later called "caviar diplomacy."

The third line is the PACE event of 24.01.2024. On that date, a decision was adopted not to ratify the credentials of the Azerbaijani parliamentary delegation. In Report 06, this event must be examined not as a definitive causal link, but as a repeated political-diplomatic timing pattern together with the 2009 and 2013 contexts.

In the applicant's view, there is at least one question to be investigated across the 2009, 2013, and 2024 events: during the periods when the Azerbaijani Embassy became active in defending the applicant, or when the applicant's case officially reached the Azerbaijani state, did Germany or European political forces connected with Germany simultaneously place Azerbaijan under pressure through the Council of Europe/PACE, sanctions, and human-rights rhetoric?

This report does not give a final answer to that question. However, it requires these three periods to be investigated together. If the 2024 PACE event is written about alone, the reason why it appears to the applicant as an important timing fact may not be fully visible. The 2009 and 2013 contexts show that, according to the applicant's assessment, a parallel political-diplomatic pressure line may have existed during periods when the Azerbaijani Embassy tried to help him.

14. The 2019 Medical Death-Risk and the Request for Embassy Assistance

The 2019 events must be assessed separately and apart from the war context.

The applicant states that, in 2019, his situation again became a medical chain carrying a risk of death. According to his account, despite a suspicion of cancer/Kaposi sarcoma, he did not receive complete and timely treatment in several hospitals; biopsies were taken from disputed or incorrect areas; and tomography/MRI and broader diagnostics were delayed or refused.

The applicant states that, at this stage, he called the Embassy of Azerbaijan and asked at least for the Embassy to contact the hospital so that he would not appear alone and defenseless. In his view, the Embassy's response effectively remained at the level of "consult a lawyer."

The legal question for the Embassy at that stage was as follows:

If an Azerbaijani citizen contacts the Embassy concerning serious illness, possible cancer, treatment and diagnostic problems, defenselessness in hospital, and risk to life, may the Embassy limit itself to general advice?

In the applicant's view, the answer is no. At minimum, the Embassy should have entered the event into the official consular record, examined the possibility of written contact with the hospital, provided written legal/medical orientation to the citizen, and transmitted the matter to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

15. The iPhone 5 and iPhone 13 Pro Events Must Be Assessed Not Separately, but as One Evidence-Device Chain

In Report 06, the iPhone 5 and iPhone 13 Pro events must not be presented as separate, coincidental phone thefts. In the applicant's view, these two events are consecutive parts of the same evidence chain.

The first stage begins with the iPhone 5. The applicant states that an important part of the video-photo evidence concerning the 2019 hospital events, suspected Kaposi sarcoma/cancer, discoloration and swelling of the leg, biopsy sites, hospital documents, and treatment was stored on the iPhone 5. The additional information letter dated 30.11.2025 states that this iPhone 5 was stolen in 2021-2022 during a U-Bahn trip from the Hermannplatz direction toward

Kottbusser Tor, that it was later searched for by signal near Kottbusser Tor, and that shortly afterward it was found in a damaged/destroyed condition. The same letter refers to an approximate 250 EUR data-recovery cost, the evidentiary importance of the iPhone 5, and the 01.03.2020 YouTube video in which the 2019 hospital events, leg symptoms, biopsy site, and documents are shown.

The second stage continues with the iPhone 13 Pro. According to the applicant, the iPhone 13 Pro was the continuation of the previous evidence chain and a later evidence carrier. The police file number for the theft event of 30.06.2023 is stated as 230701-0330-348519, and the prosecutorial references are stated as 3031 Js 4495/24 and 282 Js 3791/23.

The Berlin Police response dated 17.01.2025 states that the initial recording of the complaint did not meet the quality standards of the Berlin Police and apologizes for the applicant having been sent to several police stations. In the applicant's view, this shows that the iPhone 13 Pro event was not only a simple theft, but also a matter of failure to protect evidence and inadequate police response.

For this reason, in Report 06 the 2023 phone theft must be assessed not merely as "theft of the iPhone 13 Pro," but as a continuation of the chain of loss or destruction of evidence devices beginning with the iPhone 5.

The legal significance of this line is that the stolen or destroyed devices were not merely property items, but evidence carriers for the 2019 medical events, hospital conduct, suspected Kaposi sarcoma/cancer, police/prosecutorial complaints, and international legal applications.

Accordingly, the Embassy of Azerbaijan should have assessed the 2023 phone theft not as a simple theft event, but together with the earlier lost iPhone 5 evidence carrier as a unified problem of evidence loss and evidence preservation.

16. O2 Video Evidence - Alleged Absence of the iPhone 13 Pro Credit/Archive Trace in the System

In Report 06, the iPhone 13 Pro event must be investigated not only as a theft, but also together with the issues of the device's purchase, credit payments, and the alleged disappearance of O2 system/archive data.

The YouTube V6 video link provided by the applicant is identified as evidence of a conversation recorded at an O2 customer-service/central office. According to the applicant's explanation, the video shows a conversation with an O2 employee concerning the iPhone 13 Pro, in which the O2 system allegedly does not show or denies data concerning the credit purchase of that iPhone 13 Pro. In that conversation, the applicant objects and states that he paid O2 by bank account for the credit/device for approximately two years.

This matter is important for Report 06 because, according to the applicant, the iPhone 13 Pro was not an ordinary phone; it was the later evidence carrier after the iPhone 5 had been stolen and damaged. If the iPhone 13 Pro was both stolen and later its credit-purchase trace was not visible in the O2 system/archive, this must be investigated not as a simple property crime, but as a matter concerning the evidence chain and the legal history of the device.

For this reason, the following documents and information must be requested:

1. O2 credit/contract documents for the iPhone 13 Pro;
2. O2 system records for the device IMEI and serial number;
3. all monthly payments made from the bank account to O2;
4. O2 internal system/archive logs concerning that device;
5. police and prosecutorial files concerning the theft of the iPhone 13 Pro;
6. the original YouTube V6 video file and metadata;
7. the full context of the conversation with the O2 employee.

In the applicant's view, this video further increases the evidentiary importance of the iPhone 13 Pro. Alongside the theft of the device, the allegation that its O2 purchase/credit trace is not visible in the system must be investigated separately from the standpoint of evidence preservation, the legal history of the device, and the sequence of events.

17. 30.06.2023 iPhone 13 Pro and Shoes Theft - File Numbers and Prosecutorial Line

The 30.06.2023 event must be shown separately in Report 06 with the following file numbers:

- Police case ID / Vorgangskennung: 230701-0330-348519;
- Prosecutorial references: 3031 Js 4495/24 and 282 Js 3791/23.

The applicant states that on 30.06.2023 his mobile phone and shoes were stolen; he located the phone through a tracking application; however, instead of taking his complaint, the police directed him between several police stations.

Later, the applicant states that he saw the persons who had stolen the phone at Alexanderplatz, called the police, and that the persons were detained, but he was later informed that they could not be found. At the same time, he was offered only to collect his shoes.

This creates a serious legal contradiction:

1. If the shoes were at the police station, the stolen item had come under police control.
2. If the suspects had been detained, their identity, or at least detention records, should exist.
3. If it was later said that they "could not be found," this requires separate review of detention, release, identification, and prosecutorial decisions.
4. If the iPhone 13 Pro was an evidence carrier, this event could not be closed as a simple theft.

The complete files of the Berlin Police, the Berlin Prosecutor's Office, and subsequent prosecutorial decisions regarding this event must be requested.

18. The 25.11.2023 Zoologischer Garten Attack

For the 25.11.2023 event, the following reference must be shown in Report 06:

- GeshZ. der LPD St. 33: 01941/1727/24.

The applicant states that on that date he was attacked at Zoologischer Garten station, called the police three times, and that the police initially did not intervene sufficiently. Later, in front of the arriving police officers, the attacker broke a beer glass and attacked him again.

According to the applicant's account, the police saw the incident and detained the attacker, but after three unknown persons, appearing official or diplomatic, approached the police, the person was released.

Two video items are indicated for this incident:

- Video No. 1: FDrVRjXb-6s;
- Video No. 2: m98bXHQUKFc.

This incident is important for Report 06 because, in the applicant's view, even violence committed in front of the police did not turn into adequate criminal prosecution. This raises the question not merely of an individual police error, but of defenselessness and a possible violation of the duty to conduct an effective investigation.

19. The 13.11.2024 Hermannstraße / Hermannplatz Attack

For the 13.11.2024 event, the following file numbers must be shown in Report 06:

- Case ID / Vorgangskennung: 241113-1810-131001;
- as an additional related police document: 241120-1537-100348.

The applicant states that on the evening of 13.11.2024 he was attacked by an unknown person in the Hermannstraße and Hermannplatz area, called the police several times, and that while the attack continued the police did not intervene in a timely and effective manner.

Calls were made repeatedly to 110. The applicant states that the event occurred under surveillance cameras, that there were witnesses and people filming, and that the identity of the attacker was later established.

The particular legal significance of this event is that it is also mentioned in the response of the Embassy/MIA representative dated 26.11.2024, where it is stated that the Berlin Police were contacted, that the attacker's identity had been established, and that video footage had been obtained.

Thus, this is no longer merely the applicant's personal account; the Embassy of Azerbaijan / MIA representative addressed the Berlin Police, and certain facts of the event were recorded in an official response.

20. The Embassy/MIA Representative Response of 26.11.2024 Must Be Recorded as an Official Document

In Report 06, the 2024 application to the Embassy of Azerbaijan must be presented not only as the applicant's statement, but as a fact of awareness confirmed by an official response document.

The letter signed by Samir Shirinov, representative of the Ministry of Internal Affairs within the Embassy of the Republic of Azerbaijan in the Federal Republic of Germany, dated 26 November 2024, shows the official reference number No. 004/MR/600-1224.

The letter states that the Embassy reviewed the applicant's application concerning the fact that on 13.11.2024 he had been beaten four times by an unknown person, that he called the local police, that the person was released instead of being detained, that the events occurred under surveillance cameras, that he saw the same person again in the metro on 14.11.2024, and also concerning the theft of his mobile phone and shoes from his residence on 30.06.2023 and the intervening beer-bottle attack incident.

The letter further states that the Berlin Police were contacted in order to investigate these circumstances. According to the Berlin Police response, the 30.06.2023 event was assessed as simple theft, two persons newly known to the applicant were later identified by the police in connection with the phone theft, and after completion of the investigation the materials would be sent to the Berlin Prosecutor's Office. The letter also states that in the 13.11.2024 Hermannplatz metro incident the identity of the attacker had been established, video footage had been obtained, and the investigation was continuing.

This document is of particular significance for Report 06 because it shows that the Embassy was officially aware of the 2023-2024 phone/evidence theft and physical attack chain. Therefore, the Embassy's 2024 awareness in Report 06 must be shown not only as the applicant's witness account, but on the basis of an official document with a reference number.

This document also shows that the Embassy contacted the Berlin Police. This must be noted as an additional fact confirming that the Embassy was not completely passive. However, the legal problem is that, after this response, the matter should not have been closed merely with the police response; the evidentiary significance of the phones, the 2019 medical chain, the 2023 theft, the 2024 attacks, and the police/prosecutorial response should have been monitored together as a continuing danger line.

21. The 2025-2026 Prosecutorial and Court Line - Alleged Non-Functioning of State Mechanisms at the New Stage

The applicant's recent documents show that, in the 2025-2026 period, he also applied to police, prosecutorial, and court authorities, but, in his view, did not receive effective protection.

This stage must be shown separately in Report 06 because, in the applicant's view, not only the 2019 medical events and the 2023-2024 attacks, but also later legal-protection avenues were blocked.

21.1. Kammergericht / OLG Berlin - Section 172 StPO Application

The applicant submitted an application before the Kammergericht / Oberlandesgericht Berlin requesting a court decision under Section 172 StPO. The document shows the criminal-police Vorgangsnummer: 251219-1346-467062.

The subject of the application is stated as follows: failure to conduct criminal prosecution, danger of loss of evidence, failure to appoint an independent medical-forensic expert examination, serious health damage, and acute danger to life.

In the document, the applicant states that for more than four years he has suffered serious dental/jaw/oral-health damage, suppuration, loss of chewing function, nutritional problems, weakening, and infection risk. He states that photos, X-rays, and proof of payment exist, and that the dental-treatment costs amounted to approximately 11,000 EUR. At the same time, he notes that despite applications to prosecutors and police, no independent medical-forensic expert examination was appointed.

This document is important for Report 06 because the applicant has appealed not only to the police but as far as the Kammergericht level. In his view, however, independent expert examination, effective criminal prosecution, and preservation of evidence were still not ensured.

21.2. Staatsanwaltschaft Berlin - 253 AR 31/26

The letter of the Staatsanwaltschaft Berlin dated 16.01.2026 shows the reference 253 AR 31/26. The letter states that the applicant's writing to the Kammergericht was forwarded to the Staatsanwaltschaft Berlin, but that the relevant criminal investigation could not be identified, and it asks the applicant to indicate to which specific court, authority, and file number the writing relates.

In the applicant's view, this document raises a serious question: if he is applying regarding concrete events, file numbers, health risks, evidence, and prosecutorial passivity, why is the criminal investigation answered as "not identifiable"?

This must be shown in Report 06 as follows: the applicant seeks legal protection, but despite file numbers and facts, the linking of the application to a concrete investigation among state authorities remains a problem.

21.3. Generalstaatsanwaltschaft Berlin - 121 Zs 139/26

The letter of the Generalstaatsanwaltschaft Berlin dated 17.02.2026 shows the reference 121 Zs 139/26. The letter states that the applicant's complaint of 13.01.2026 was registered under this file number.

This document shows that the applicant's complaint was also registered at the level of the Generalstaatsanwaltschaft Berlin. This is important for Report 06: the applicant's complaints are not merely personal concerns, but registered applications at the level of the Berlin General Prosecutor's Office.

21.4. Dental Crime, Medical-Forensic Expert Examination, and Request for Independent Investigation

In the supplementary application to the Kammergericht/OLG dated 14.01.2026, the applicant sets out concrete facts regarding dental treatment, surgical intervention, implants, Yevsey Ananyev, Dima, and alleged treatment errors.

In the document, the applicant describes implantological interventions in 2025, the serious surgical event of 10.03.2025, the entry of an implant into the sinus/maxillary sinus area, intervention with a metal instrument, payment of 4,000 EUR, an additional implant on 10.05.2025, and payment of 1,000 EUR.

This line is noted in Report 06 because the applicant has already brought serious dental and medical harm, possible treatment error, payment, and evidence issues to the prosecutorial and court level. In his view, however, no independent medical-forensic expert examination has been provided.

22. Sozialgericht Berlin and AOK Nordost Line - S 193 KR 463/26 ER

The applicant's recent documents show that the dental/health matter continues not only in the criminal/prosecutorial sphere, but also in the social-court and health-insurance sphere.

The document of Sozialgericht Berlin dated 27.05.2026 shows the file number S 193 KR 463/26 ER. The subject of the document concerns AOK Nordost's responsibility for dental-treatment costs, delayed decisions, additional payment demands, and urgent medical need.

In the document, the applicant states that immediately before a dental appointment on 27.05.2026, he was confronted with a payment demand of 1,575 EUR. There had previously been an approximately 450 EUR payment demand as well. The applicant presents this as the result of AOK Nordost's years-long delayed, incomplete, and unclear dental-coverage policy.

The document emphasizes that the applicant has lived for years with serious loss of chewing function, broken teeth, nutritional problems, infection risk, and a background of severe chronic illnesses. The document refers to AIDS/HIV, tuberculosis, hepatitis, infection risks, and oncological suspicions as a serious health background. The applicant states that the absence of chewing function is not a matter of mere comfort, but a life-related health danger.

The document cites legal bases including Article 2(2) of the Grundgesetz, Article 19(4) GG, Section 86b SGG, Section 103 SGG, Section 27 SGB V, Section 2 SGB V, Section 249 BGB, and Section 823 BGB. This shows that the applicant raised the matter not as dental cosmetics or a voluntary implant request, but as a matter of life, bodily integrity, medical provision, urgent judicial protection, and prevention of damage.

This line is important for Report 06 because the applicant states that his risk to life and health did not end with the 2019 hospital issue. In the 2025-2026 period, dental/oral health, nutrition, infection, and health-insurance problems again placed him in serious health danger.

This must be noted in Report 06 as follows: according to the applicant, German state and quasi-state mechanisms - health insurance, social court, prosecutors, and judicial oversight - fragment his health danger into separate formal procedures, but do not provide effective protection aimed at safeguarding the life-and-health risk as a whole.

23. Vollstreckungsverfahren 3034 Js 3591/24 and the GdB 100 Issue

The Stellungnahme document dated 28.04.2026 shows that enforcement proceedings under Az.: 3034 Js 3591/24 were being conducted against the applicant. In that document, the applicant states that he is officially recognized as severely disabled with GdB 100 and that this was not sufficiently taken into account in the court/prosecutorial procedure.

The document also refers to the decision of the Landgericht Berlin dated 14.12.2020:

Az.: (573) 282 AR 190/20 Ns (45/20).

The applicant states that there had previously been a court decision in a similar metro/ticket matter, but that in later procedures his GdB 100, health condition, disadvantage compensation, and rights in public transport were not sufficiently taken into account.

The document cites CRPD, ECHR, and ICCPR provisions:

- CRPD Article 2, 5, 12, 13, 14;
- ECHR Article 3, 6, 8, 13, 14;
- ICCPR Article 26.

This document is significant for Report 06 because the applicant states that he was left defenseless not only in relation to medical and police crimes, but also in the field of disability rights and criminal enforcement/Vollstreckung. In his view, although the GdB 100 status was officially recognized, the practical protections and rights arising from that status were not implemented; instead, sanctions and enforcement mechanisms were activated against him.

This further strengthens the applicant's main thesis: "The German state did not protect me; I was forced to protect myself from the German state."

24. General Legal Meaning of the 2023-2026 Period - No Longer an Isolated Event, but an Allegation of Consecutive Non-Functioning of State Mechanisms

Taken together, the applicant's recent documents show that the following state or state-linked mechanisms were aware of, or involved in, the process:

1. Berlin Police;
2. Berlin Police Complaints Office;
3. Staatsanwaltschaft Berlin;
4. Generalstaatsanwaltschaft Berlin;
5. Kammergericht / Oberlandesgericht Berlin;
6. Sozialgericht Berlin;
7. AOK Nordost;
8. dentists / dental-treatment chain;
9. the Embassy of the Republic of Azerbaijan in Germany and the MIA representative within the Embassy;
10. at earlier stages, the Bundestag, BGH, Kammergericht, Betreuung, ECtHR, and other legal mechanisms.

In the applicant's view, despite so many authorities and file numbers, his life, health, evidence, and physical security were not effectively protected.

For this reason, the conclusion for recent years in Report 06 must be as follows:

This no longer appears to be merely the sum of separate errors. According to the documents submitted by the applicant, in the 2019-2026 period, the medical, criminal, prosecutorial, social-court, disability-rights, and consular-protection lines became interconnected. In each line, the applicant applied to some authority and file numbers were created, but, in his view, no line led to a result that actually protected his life and health.

This allows the applicant's expression "I have been left with death" to be legally understood as follows: the applicant considers himself to have been effectively left alone by state mechanisms in the face of real physical death danger, medical collapse, nutritional and infection risk, loss of evidence, lack of police protection, and fragmentation of legal protection.

This expression should not be assessed as an emotional complaint, but in the context of the numerous applications, file numbers, and unanswered protection requests visible in the documents.

25. The 24 January 2024 PACE Event and the Question of Timing

On 24 January 2024, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe adopted a decision not to ratify the credentials of the Azerbaijani parliamentary delegation. The official basis was stated to be Azerbaijan's failure to fulfill its main obligations before the Council of Europe.

The applicant presents this event not as a definitive causal link, but as a political-diplomatic context to be investigated from the standpoint of timing.

In his view, the 2019 medical death-risk, the theft and destruction of the iPhone 5 evidence device, the 2023 theft of the iPhone 13 Pro, the 2023-2024 street attacks, the Embassy's correspondence with German authorities, the alleged lack of prosecutorial and judicial protection in 2025-2026, and the 24.01.2024 PACE decision should be examined together from the political-diplomatic standpoint within the same general period. This timing may be coincidental, but it must not be excluded from investigation.

This section must be presented with the following formulation:

This report does not assert a definitive causal relationship between the PACE decision of 24.01.2024 and the events against the applicant. However, the applicant requires this line to be investigated separately from the standpoint of timing, parallel political-diplomatic context, and the Embassy's awareness during that period.

26. Current Fear and the Need for Urgent Consular Protection

The applicant states that the events he has experienced over 28 years, the chain visible in Report 005 and Report 008, the 2003 document package, the 2019 medical death-risk, the iPhone 5 and iPhone 13 Pro evidence chain, the 2023-2024 street attacks, and the 2025-2026 dental/Sozialgericht/prosecutorial/OLG line increase his current fear of danger.

In the applicant's view, the previous methods have escalated stage by stage: first social and medical defenselessness, then psychiatric-legal neutralization, then theft of evidence, then open street attacks, and later the renewed failure of prosecutorial, judicial, and health-insurance mechanisms to provide effective protection.

For this reason, he states that he has a serious fear regarding what new and still unknown method may be used in the future.

This statement must not be treated as conclusive proof of a future event, but as a serious danger warning based on the gravity of the previous chain.

The applicant particularly states that the fear that the Azerbaijani Embassy may again be unable to provide effective protection because of political-diplomatic pressure from Germany creates hopelessness and a sense of danger in him.

For this reason, the following conclusion must be noted in Report 06:

The applicant is not currently seeking only an investigation into past rights violations. He also requires that the current and future danger risk be officially registered by the Embassy of Azerbaijan as a consular risk. Any new event against his life, health, evidence, or physical security must be investigated not separately from the previous chain, but as a continuation of that chain.

27. Minimal Steps the Embassy Should Take

On the basis of Report 06, the minimal steps expected from the Embassy of the Republic of Azerbaijan in Germany are as follows:

1. open a separate consular-legal file for Ismail Rustam's case;
2. register the 2010, 2013, 2019, 2023, 2024, 2025, and 2026 applications as one continuing risk chain;
3. assess the Parviz Yazdani summary not as a final conclusion, but as an initial legal warning;
4. include Report 005, Report 008, the 2003 document package, and the 2019-2026 evidence in the file;
5. send written inquiries to German authorities not in general terms, but specifically concerning risks to life, health, evidence, and physical security;
6. assist in obtaining documents relating to the 2003 VG 32 A 599/03 and hospital archives;
7. raise the issue of preserving medical files and video evidence relating to the 2019 hospital chain;
8. investigate the iPhone 5 and iPhone 13 Pro events together as an evidence-device chain;
9. request verification of the O2 V6 video, bank payments, O2 credit agreement, IMEI, and system/archive records;
10. investigate the 2023 phone theft not as a simple property crime, but as a possible theft of evidence carriers;
11. request complete copies of police/prosecutorial decisions relating to the 2023-2024 attacks;

12. request complete copies of the files in the 30.06.2023 matters: 230701-0330-348519, 3031 Js 4495/24, 282 Js 3791/23;
 13. request the materials concerning the 25.11.2023 Zoologischer Garten event under LPD St. 33: 01941/1727/24;
 14. request the files concerning the 13.11.2024 Hermannplatz event: 241113-1810-131001 and 241120-1537-100348;
 15. take into account the 2025-2026 Kammergericht/OLG line under 251219-1346-467062;
 16. monitor the results of the Staatsanwaltschaft Berlin 253 AR 31/26 and Generalstaatsanwaltschaft Berlin 121 Zs 139/26 lines;
 17. include the dental/health-danger line under Sozialgericht Berlin S 193 KR 463/26 ER in the file;
 18. note separately the Vollstreckung 3034 Js 3591/24 and GdB 100 rights issue;
 19. investigate the connection between the Landgericht Berlin decision (573) 282 AR 190/20 Ns (45/20) and the later Vollstreckung matter;
 20. officially register the applicant's current danger warning;
 21. send a broad, written, fact-based consular report to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs;
 22. provide the applicant with dated and written responses regarding all steps.
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28. Preliminary Legal Conclusion

On the basis of the available materials, the preliminary legal conclusion of Report 06 is as follows:

1. The Azerbaijani Embassy was significantly aware of Ismail Rustam's case.
 2. The Embassy provided real assistance at certain stages.
 3. This assistance is particularly visible in the 2008-2009 Ruhland line, the 2013 Yazdani/more-than-7,000-pages stage, and the 2024 Samir Shirinov/MIA representative response.
 4. However, this assistance did not develop into continuous, systematic, and result-tracking consular protection corresponding to the seriousness of the case.
 5. Yazdani's indication that the case required broader international-law and specialist assistance should have created an obligation for the Embassy to take further steps.
 6. The 2019 medical death-risk, the theft and destruction of the iPhone 5 evidence device, the theft of the iPhone 13 Pro, the allegation regarding the O2 system/archive trace, the 2023-2024 physical attacks, and the 2025-2026 prosecutorial/OLG/Sozialgericht/Vollstreckung lines should have been assessed by the Embassy not as separate events, but as one continuing danger line.
 7. Azerbaijan's situation in 2008-2013, in the context of occupation, refugees, frontline tension, and political-diplomatic pressure, must be taken into account when assessing the Embassy's conduct; however, this context does not fully justify the applicant's remaining defenseless.
 8. This report does not assert a definitive causal relationship between the 24.01.2024 PACE decision and the 2019-2026 danger chain, but it notes the issue as a political-diplomatic context to be investigated from the standpoint of timing.
 9. This case is no longer an ordinary citizen complaint. It is a consular-protection matter involving long-term risks to the life, health, evidence, and physical security of an Azerbaijani citizen abroad.
 10. In the applicant's view, the events of recent years must be investigated as the result of open crimes and the failure of state authorities to fulfill their duty of protection. This is noted not to criticize the Embassy, but so that the Azerbaijani Embassy will now treat this case not as an ordinary complaint, but as a serious international-legal protection matter.
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29. Final Formula

The central legal question of this report is as follows:

Could the Embassy of the Republic of Azerbaijan in Germany close, with only a general lawyer summary, general advice, police responses, and separate formal procedures, the serious and documented allegations of its citizen concerning life, health, human dignity, judicial protection, medical assistance, preservation of evidence, physical security, disability rights, and prosecutorial/judicial protection?

On the basis of the available materials, the answer is no.

In such a case, the Embassy's duty was not merely to provide formal responses, but to organize real, expert-based, continuous, and written-tracked consular-legal protection in order to eliminate the citizen's factual defenselessness.

The applicant presents this report not in order to accuse the Azerbaijani state, but in order for the Azerbaijani state to protect its citizen from the alleged severe and long-term danger chain inside Germany.

His final position is as follows:

The German state did not protect me; I was forced to protect myself from the German state. The Azerbaijani Embassy must now treat this reality not as an ordinary complaint, but as a matter of life, health, evidence, physical security, and international law requiring urgent consular protection.

The applicant summarizes his situation as follows:

For years I was not protected by the state mechanisms that were supposed to protect me. I was effectively left alone with death, medical collapse, loss of evidence, street violence, and fragmentation of legal protection. For this reason, my demand from the Azerbaijani Embassy is that it treat this case no longer as an ordinary consular application, but as an urgent protection matter carrying a risk to life and security.