Arşiv

📂 2000

2000 — The Overturning of Continued Detention, Punishment on a Charge of “Unlawful Stay,” and Life Without Social and Medical Assistance This folder contains court decisions, correspondence from lawyers, Duldung documents, my applications for social and medical assistance, and statements concerning my living conditions at the time. These materials show how the events that began in 1998–1999 continued in 2000. The principal references are: Amtsgericht Schöneberg — 70 XIV 3782/99 B; Amtsgericht Tiergarten — 251a Ds 349/00; Verwaltungsgericht Berlin — VG 32 A 594.00; Oberverwaltungsgericht Berlin — 6 SN 196.00. On 27 January 2000, Landgericht Berlin overturned the decision of 21 December 1999 ordering my continued detention, rejected the application for detention and ordered my immediate release. The decision states that my period of detention in 1998 also had to be taken into account and that deportation was not expected to be carried out within the remaining period. This decision and the documents concerning its implementation are included in the folder. This outcome was not personal assistance offered by the court on its own initiative. Following my lawyer’s appeal, the legal grounds for my continued detention were examined and the decision was overturned. However, my release did not result in the removal of the causes that had brought me into this situation. This raises a decisive question for me: why did the Landgericht examining the case fail to assess the legal consequences of my unsuccessful requests for documents and assistance after my release in 1998, and of the public authorities leaving me undocumented and homeless? This is precisely my objection: my continued detention was stopped, but responsibility for the circumstances that had led to my renewed detention remained unresolved. I regard this as a concealment of the responsibility of public authorities. The release order did not resolve the continuing deprivation in my life. The issue was not simply that I had no document in my possession. My objection is that, despite my applications, the public authorities failed to formalise my legal status, kept me in the position of an “illegal resident,” meaning a person staying unlawfully, and then used that same situation as grounds for my renewed detention and punishment. The loss of a passport and a charge of unlawful stay in Germany are not the same matter. In my case, the criminal conviction was imposed not merely because I had lost a document, but on a charge of remaining in the country without a residence permit or Duldung. When reviewing my continued detention, the Landgericht examined my earlier detention, the possibility of deportation and the process of obtaining documents. My central objection is therefore this: why did that examination leave unanswered the question of how a legal situation that the state had failed to formalise was turned against me? I regard the court’s approach of stopping only the continued detention without addressing this issue as concealing responsibility while leaving me to bear the consequences. The subsequent acquittal does not remove this question; it demonstrates how decisive it was. The Duldung document dated 1 February 2000 prohibited employment, education and vocational training, and restricted my permitted area of movement to Berlin. Thus, after my release from detention, I was also denied the opportunity to support myself through my own work. On 25 February 2000, I applied to Sozialamt Reinickendorf for assistance. My sworn statement dated 5 October, included in this folder, records that I had received no assistance by that time, that it was impossible to collect the statements required from people who had helped me, and that I had not been issued a Krankenschein — a medical treatment voucher allowing me to consult a doctor. The problems of accommodation, nutrition and medical care had already been reported to the public authorities in writing at the time. Meanwhile, on 19 July 2000, Amtsgericht Tiergarten sentenced me on the charge of unlawful stay to a fine of 120 daily units of 10 Deutsche Marks each, totalling 1,200 Deutsche Marks. The situation I had repeatedly approached the public authorities to resolve became the basis for my punishment. The judgment does not explain why those applications had produced no result. Thus, the failure to formalise my legal status was subsequently attributed to me as my own fault. My objection is that the absence of a Duldung that the state had not issued was presented as my deliberately remaining unlawfully, and I was convicted as a criminal. The effects of this judgment on my living conditions, my access to assistance and my subsequent legal protection cannot be separated from the overall sequence of events. The subsequent history of this judgment demonstrates the importance of that contradiction. On 17 December 2003, Landgericht Berlin ruled that reopening the proceedings was admissible. On 3 January 2005, Amtsgericht Tiergarten overturned the previous judgment, acquitted me and recognised my entitlement to compensation for that conviction. The acquittal established that, because valid documents for deportation were unavailable, I had been entitled to a Duldung and therefore could not be punished on that charge of unlawful stay. This shows that the basis of my objection to the earlier judgment was subsequently confirmed by a court decision. However, overturning the judgment did not undo the deprivation I had suffered during the intervening years. The legal significance of this issue is also clearly set out in the Bundesverfassungsgericht decision of 6 March 2003, 2 BvR 397/02: a criminal court must not rely solely on the fact that no Duldung was issued, but must itself examine whether the person was entitled to one. Otherwise, unlawful conduct by the immigration authorities would be accepted, and the person’s punishment would be made dependent on those authorities’ conduct. This legal issue was also considered in the decision permitting the reopening of my case. At that time, I approached Planta to understand why assistance and permission to work were not being granted. Planta told me that the problem was connected to the criminal judgment and that the situation could not be resolved unless that judgment was overturned. I understood this connection from that explanation at the time. This conversation is part of the events I experienced: I was seeking assistance, but was confronted with the requirement to first have my conviction removed. On 23 October 2000, Verwaltungsgericht Berlin rejected my urgent application for social and medical assistance. The court relied on its conclusion that I was obstructing deportation by failing to produce my passport and stated that the need for urgent treatment had not been sufficiently demonstrated. As a result, the accommodation and medical assistance I needed at that moment were not secured through judicial protection. The decision identifies the specific legal basis for restricting assistance as AsylbLG § 1a, point 2, as applicable at the time. The court accepted that deportation could not be carried out for reasons for which I was responsible. That is the reasoning stated in the decision. I object to that assessment: my unsuccessful approaches to the public authorities, the failure to formalise my legal status and my efforts to obtain assistance had been turned against me. For me, the criminal judgment, my immigration status, the prohibition on working and the restriction of social assistance were not separate pieces of paper. I experienced their consequences within the same life: I could not support myself through my own work, could not obtain assistance and had to struggle for access to treatment while ill. In my conversation with Planta, I was told that the criminal judgment was an obstacle to resolving my situation. In the Verwaltungsgericht decision, the restriction of assistance was separately justified under AsylbLG § 1a. Both matters formed part of the legal deadlock imposed on me. I also strongly object to the assessment of the medical documents. Medical certificates and examination results had been submitted to the court. The decision shows that those documents were considered, but they were not accepted as sufficient to secure the urgent medical assistance I requested. I describe this as a biased assessment of my health and the medical materials submitted. Despite my applications concerning illness and the need for assistance, effective protection was not provided. My objection concerns not merely the wording of the decision, but its consequence: an ill person was left without assistance and treatment. During that period, I also experienced another deadlock in obtaining access to the courts. Because I was not receiving social assistance, I sought judicial protection against the Sozialamt and requested Prozesskostenhilfe — assistance with the costs of court proceedings. However, I was told that I had to bring a Bescheid — a decision document — from the Sozialamt. This concerns the document called a “Bescheid” in German, not a five-month waiting period. The contradiction I experienced was this: I wanted to complain about the failure to provide assistance, but to obtain legal aid I was required to bring a document from the very authority that was not providing that assistance. The acquaintance accompanying me also objected and asked where I was supposed to obtain a document they were not giving me. I am not specifying that person’s name because I cannot currently state it with certainty. This incident is a difficulty in obtaining judicial protection in which I personally participated and which I remember. Requiring proof of my financial circumstances and placing me in a position where I could not effectively bring a complaint are not the same thing. ZPO § 117(2) provides for a declaration of financial circumstances and supporting evidence; it does not identify a Sozialamt benefits decision as the only acceptable evidence. My objection is that a document I could not obtain had become an obstacle to my access to legal protection. In correspondence dated 9 November, the Oberverwaltungsgericht questioned important parts of this reasoning; on 4 December 2000, it granted permission for the appeal to be heard. These documents show that the legal struggle against the refusal of assistance continued. My health problems also continued. The materials from that period include medication for bronchitis, weakness, vomiting, information concerning hepatitis B and my search for treatment. The medical documents from 2002, 2004 and 2007 included in the folder are separately dated materials concerning my subsequent condition. My position concerning these events is grounded in Article 1 of the German Basic Law, which protects human dignity, and Article 2(2), which guarantees life, physical integrity and personal liberty. These guarantees also bind public authorities and courts. My objection is that their translation into effective protection in my life was not secured. Article 19(4), which guarantees access to judicial remedies against violations by public authority, and Article 103(1), which protects the right to be heard in court, are also central legal references here. A person left without assistance must not be denied effective access to protection through inaccessible documents and financial hardship. Under international law, I refer to Articles 2, 3, 5 and 13 of the European Convention on Human Rights — the right to life, the prohibition of inhuman and degrading treatment, the right to liberty and security, and the right to an effective remedy. I state that the detention, serious illness, homelessness and failure to provide assistance that I experienced must be assessed together in light of these guarantees. For me, 2000 was not a year in which the danger ended with my release from detention. The prohibition on working, the failure to provide social assistance, barriers to medical care and the criminal judgment that was subsequently overturned all constrained my life during the same period. I do not accept this sequence as a series of isolated errors without consequences. The folder shows how state decisions and the failure to provide protection jointly affected a person’s health, livelihood and life. My position is this: the deprivation that began in 1998 continued through a second detention and violence in 1999, and through conviction, restrictions on assistance and obstacles to legal protection in 2000. The subsequent acquittal overturned the earlier judgment, but did not automatically restore my lost years or health. This folder is a public archival explanation of those consequences, legal contradictions and my position concerning responsibility; it is not a separate letter addressed to an authority.